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Montana’s Campaign Contribution Limits Put to the Test in Lair v. 
Bullock 
 
Connor Walker  
I. MONTANA’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS HAVE 
TRADITIONALLY COMBATTED CORRUPTION 
   Montana has a long history of political corruption dating back 
more than a century.1 The state’s citizens have an unusually strong 
motivation to rein in the power that large donors have over political 
candidates. Montana’s populist political culture developed through the 
long and eventually successful effort to seize control of the state 
GOVERNMENT from the grasp of an entrenched oligarchy. To this day, 
Montana schools pass down the story of how the ‘Copper Kings’ mining 
barons were finally evicted from the state legislature through populist 
election reform. Montana’s culture and institutions resonate with the 
memory of these events, and the state’s campaign finance regulations can 
only be properly understood in this context.2 
 Montana’s campaign contribution limits were passed by popular 
referendum in 1994.3 The limits were tested in Montana Right to Life 
Association v. Eddleman,4 when the Ninth Circuit ruled that Montana’s 
laws did not unconstitutionally limit freedom of speech.5 In Eddleman, 
the Ninth Circuit determined: (1) there was adequate evidence that the 
regulation furthered a sufficiently important state interest, and (2) the 
limits were closely drawn—(a) focusing narrowly on the state’s interest; 
(b) leaving the contributor free to affiliate with the candidate; and (c) 
allowing the candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective 
campaign.6 The Eddleman court also found that the state interest 
included “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.”7  
 Less than a decade later in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,8 the United States Supreme Court in a 5–4 ruling 
significantly restricted states’ power to regulate campaign finance.9 
Citizens United limited the state interest in regulating campaign 
                                           
1 See, e.g., C. B. GLASSCOCK, WAR OF THE COPPER KINGS (1971). 
2 See, e.g., W. Tradition P'ship v. AG, 271 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2011). 
3 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–37–216–218 (2015). 
4 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 
5 Id. at 1088. 
6 Id. at 1092. 
7 Id. 
8 558 U.S. 310 (2010). (Though Citizens United did identify a compelling state interest it did not say 
that there were no other lawful state interests. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit has left the door open to an 
analysis of this question by ordering the trial court to identify what the state interest is.) 
9 Id. at 359. 
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contributions to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.10 In the 
aftermath of Citizens United, state campaign finance laws across the 
country are being reexamined. An example is the United States Supreme 
Court’s plurality decision in Randall v. Sorell,11 which applied a different 
test to Vermont’s campaign finance laws than the Ninth Circuit had 
applied in Eddleman.12 However, in Randall, there was no majority 
opinion since Justice Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning 
and concurred separately.13 The focus of this note, Lair v. Bullock,14 
provides another example. In Lair, the question was whether Citizens 
United had changed the law so much that a different test must apply, 
such as the one used by the plurality in Randall.15 
 
II. MONTANA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ARE CHALLENGED 
  In Lair v. Murry,16 (“Lair I) several candidates, contributors, and 
political organizations (together “the plaintiffs”) brought suit to 
challenge Montana’s dollar limits on campaign contributions.17 
Montana’s limits differ for contributions by individuals and for 
contributions by political organizations (e.g., parties and PACs).18 The 
plaintiffs challenged the contribution limits on First Amendment 
grounds, claiming limits on contributions effectively abridge free speech 
in two ways: limiting contributions curtails a donor’s free expression to 
associate with the candidate, and contribution limits reduce the amount 
of political speech that the candidate can express.19 Montana defended 
the limits as necessary to achieve the compelling state interest of a 
corruption-free election process.20 As a result of these laws Montana’s 
elections are some of the most competitive in the country because 
candidates are funded mainly by small donors.21 
 
A. District Court Finds Montana’s Contribution Limits Unconstitutional 
 
 In a bench trial, the district court held that Montana’s campaign 
finance limits unconstitutionally abridged the plaintiffs’ freedom of 
                                           
10 Id.   
11 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 265–273 (Thomas, J. with  Scalia, J., concurring). 
14 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Lair II]. 
15 Id. 
16 903 F.Supp.2d 1077 (D. Mont. 2012) (Lair I) rev’d, sub nom. Lair II. (Defendant Jim Murry was 
Montana’s Commissioner of Political Practices and was replaced by Atty. Gen. Bullock as named 
defendant on appeal.) 
17 Id. at 1078–1079. 
18 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–37–216. 
19 Lair I, 903 F.Supp.2d at 1078. 
20 Id. at 1084. 
21 Id. at 1083; see also Edwin Bender, Symposium Article & Essay, Evidencing A Republican Form 
of Government: The Influence of Campaign Money on State-Level Elections, 74 MONT. L. REV. 165. 
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speech.22 The district court did not feel bound by Eddleman, but instead 
looked to the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Randall, reasoning 
that Randall had abrogated Eddleman.23 The district court used the test 
applied in Randall to see if the contribution limits were closely drawn to 
match a state interest, and concluded they were not.24 The district court 
determined that the contribution limits prevented candidates from 
amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy.25 The 
district court also ruled that even assuming Montana had a sufficiently 
important interest at stake, the contribution limits were not closely drawn 
to match that assumed interest.26 Montana appealed. 
 
B. The Ninth Circuit Reverses the District Court 
 
 On appeal, now as Lair v. Bullock, (“Lair II”) the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case, ruling that 
Randall was not the controlling opinion.27 Instead, it ruled Randall’s 
plurality did not abrogate Eddleman and its analysis remained good 
law.28 Citizens United had only refined the compelling state interest to 
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, but Eddleman showed how 
limits on campaign contributions can be closely drawn: the state must 
have (1) a compelling state interest; and (2) the interest must be narrowly 
tailored by leaving (a) contributors free to affiliate with candidates, and 
(b) candidates capable of raising sufficient funds to run an effective 
campaign.29 The Ninth Circuit concluded the district court also erred 
when it did not identify the state’s interest: it should not have assumed 
the state interest existed in considering whether the regulations were 
closely drawn.30 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court 
with instructions to determine whether there was a compelling state 
interest of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance as defined by 
Citizens United.31 Alternatively, if the district court again assumes there 
is a state interest, it must at least identify what that interest is.32 After 
making that determination, the district court must then consider whether 
the regulation was closely drawn—but this time under Eddleman rather 
than Randall.33  
 
                                           
22 Lair I, 903 F.Supp.2d at 1093. 
23 Id. at 1087. 
24 Id. at 1089. 
25 Id. at 1091–1092. 
26 Id. at 32–33. 
27 Lair II, 798 F.3d 736. 
28 Id. at 747. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 748. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 748–749. 
33 Lair II, 798 F.3d at 478–749. 
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III. MONTANA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
SOUND 
 
 The district court should uphold Montana’s limits because under 
the Eddleman analysis Montana has compelling state interest and the 
contribution limits are closely drawn. The campaign contribution limits 
combat corruption. Additionally, Montana’s campaign contribution 
limits are not too low to allow donors to freely associate with the 
candidate. Candidates continue to have sufficient resources to wage 
effective campaigns, and the limits are narrowly tailored. Therefore, the 
limits do not unconstitutionally abridge the donors’ freedom of speech.  
 
A. Montana Still Has a Compelling State Interest 
 
 Montana’s compelling state interest in campaign finance 
regulation is restricted to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.34 
Quid pro quo corruption is not limited to criminal bribery; it also 
includes other types of corruption that are something less than criminal, 
such as dollars-for-votes transactions or even the appearance of such 
corruption.35 This definition excludes ‘mere influence’ over politicians, 
but does include trading votes for contributions.36 The risk of quid pro 
quo corruption is generally applicable only to money directed to a 
candidate or officeholder.37  
 Montana has a demonstrated interest in combating quid pro quo 
corruption. Although the Eddleman opinion defined the state interest 
more broadly than would be allowed now, the facts of that case 
supported a narrower holding consistent with Citizen’s United.38 In 
Eddleman, a 30-year veteran of the Montana legislature testified that 
special interest groups targeted contributions when particular issues 
approached a vote “because it gets results.”39 A state senator exposed 
dollars-for-votes contributions by the insurance industry.40 This quid pro 
quo activity goes beyond ‘mere influence’ into the territory of quid pro 
quo corruption. Montana’s compelling state interest has sufficient 
evidentiary support to pass constitutional muster.  
 
B. Citizens Can Freely Affiliate with Candidates 
 
                                           
34 Id. at 742. 
35 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (citing Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 360). 
36 Id. 
37 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003). 
38 Id. 
39 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1093. 
40 Id. 
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 Montana’s campaign contribution limits do not significantly 
limit citizens’ ability to affiliate with candidates. In Eddleman, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that Montana’s campaign finance laws allowed contributors 
to freely associate with the candidates.41 Since Eddleman was decided, 
there has not been any change to citizen’s freedom to affiliate with 
candidates. Citizens are free to volunteer and participate in campaigns.  
Citizens may continue to donate to candidates within the limits. They can 
also use social media and other electronic platforms to associate with 
candidates. The freedom to associate is not implicated in Montana’s 
campaign contribution limits. 
 
C. Candidates Can Wage Effective Campaigns 
 
 Montana’s contribution limits do not prevent candidates from 
having sufficient resources for an effective campaign. Although the 
district court’s first analysis was done under Randall, the sufficient 
resources test is also an Eddleman factor. In the Randall analysis, the 
district court held that Montana’s limits were unconstitutionally low 
because they were below the ‘lower bound’ of limits acceptable.42 
However, under Eddleman the test is simply whether candidates have 
enough resources to mount an effective campaign.43 The resources 
requirement is not limited to individual campaign contributions—
resources can come from many donors; including political parties, PACs, 
and volunteers. The Ninth Circuit determined in Eddleman that 
Montana’s limits did allow campaigns to raise adequate resources.44 It 
observed that 90% of donors do not contribute up to the limits.45 Political 
parties and PACs can still accept large contributions, which can then be 
spent supporting campaigns.46 These organizations are subject to 
enhanced disclosure requirements, which serves the state’s interest in 
monitoring potential quid pro quo corruption while also allowing 
campaigns to amass sufficient resources to wage effective campaigns.  
 
D. Montana’s Limits Are Narrowly Tailored 
 
 Montana’s laws remain narrowly tailored because contribution 
limits differ depending on the contributor, which is a structure that 
directly addresses the corruption interest. Narrow tailoring does not 
require the exhaustion of every conceivable alternative, as long as the 
laws are closely drawn to a state interest.47 Contributions by individuals 
                                           
41 Id. at 1098. 
42 Lair I, 903 F.Supp.2d at 31, 44. 
43 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. 
44 Id. at 1096. 
45 Id. at 1094. 
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–37–229. 
47 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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are capped at a lower level than those made by political organizations. 
The lower individual contributions are large enough to allow free 
association with a candidate but small enough to prevent quid pro quo 
‘dollars for votes’ contributions. The higher cap on contributions by 
organizations like parties and PACs allows candidates to amass sufficient 
resources. Put together, the structure is narrowly tailored to the state’s 
interest in curbing corruption or its appearance.48  
 Disclosure requirements also support the narrow tailoring 
requirement. The plaintiffs contend the laws are not closely drawn 
because the political party limit is under-inclusive—exceptions for 
personal expenses allowed under the individual contribution limits render 
contribution limits moot.49 A private donor can pay for personal services 
to a candidate, but if the donor gives that money to a party and the party 
gives it to the candidate, then the law is violated.50 The individual limits 
are too low for any serious allegations of corruption, but at the same time 
donors can give unlimited amounts under the personal expenses 
exception. However, personal services contribution are subject to 
enhanced disclosure requirements under Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–229, 
which allows the public to scrutinize donors and candidates who attempt 
to evade contribution limits. The contribution limits together with the 
disclosure requirements are narrowly tailored to limit or publicize 
individuals’ financial involvements with candidates. 
 Montana’s limits are still narrowly tailored—Citizens United did 
not change this part of the analysis. In Eddleman, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that Montana’s limits were closely drawn to prevent undue 
influence, and quid pro quo corruption is a subset of undue influence.51 
The laws were not too restrictive using the looser definition of the state 
interest, and they likely are not too restrictive using Citizens United’s 
narrower definition. Montana’s campaign contribution limits are 
narrowly tailored to the state interest. 
 
IV. MONTANA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS SHOULD BE UPHELD 
 
 Montana’s campaign contribution limits directly address the 
anti-corruption state interest. While the minimum standard for corruption 
applied in Eddleman was much broader, the facts of that case also meet 
the definition of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Even if the 
contribution limits were originally conceived to prohibit a broader range 
of activity, they are still sufficiently tailored to pass muster under the 
                                           
48 Id. 
49 James Bopp, Jr., Counsel for the Appellee, Oral Arguments re: Lair v. Bullock (Feb. 5, 2015), 
available at https://youtu.be/2xxMyJ3dzzs. 
50 Id. 
51 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092–93. 
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narrower Citizens United standard. Montana’s long history of combatting 
corruption demonstrates that there is a compelling state interest.  
 Montana’s contribution limits are also closely drawn to that anti-
corruption interest. There is a freedom to affiliate that has been 
unchanged since Eddleman was decided. While Montana’s individual 
contribution limits are low by national standards, candidates still are 
capable of amassing sufficient resources to mount effective campaigns. 
Under an Eddleman analysis, the contribution limits are not so stifling as 
to render campaigns ineffective. Montanans wanted low contribution 
limits specifically to combat the type of quid pro quo corruption 
experienced in the age of the Copper Kings by requiring candidates to 
obtain broad-based contribution support.52 The limits are narrowly 
tailored given Montana’s history of political corruption. Because 
Montana has a compelling state interest and its campaign contribution 
limits are narrowly tailored to that interest, the limits should be upheld in 
the next hearing before the district court.  
 
 
                                           
52 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–35–504 (mandating Montana’s congressional delegation work to 
amend the U.S. Constitution to abrogate Citizen’s United’s restrictions). 
